We use data on political beliefs (broadly, left-right position, meritocracy and origins of poverty) to discuss Venezuela's economic institutions. Our starting point is the large role attributed to beliefs in determining the economic system and the extent of government intervention (see, for example, Alesina et al, 2001) . This brings us to the question of what causes changes in beliefs. We briefly discuss and present some evidence consistent with the idea that some of the main social and economic forces that affected Venezuela this century may have changed people's rational beliefs. These include a dependence on oil, a history of macro-economic volatility, the rise in crime and the rise in a preoccupation with corruption. We end up with a cautionary result: although these results point in the direction of giving a role to real shocks in the determination of beliefs, we test and find that perceptions for different phenomena are sometimes correlated. In particular, the perception of corruption is related to the perception of crime rather than the amount of real corruption actually experienced. JEL: P16, E62. Keywords: beliefs, oil, crime, corruption, macro volatility, perceptions, causality. 
I. Introduction
In an important paper, Piketty (1995) showed how beliefs could be central to economic organization.
He focused on beliefs concerning the income generating process and argued that when income was determined by luck, rational agents would be inclined to increase taxes. In contrast, when effort played a large role, rational agents fearing adverse incentive effects would moderate taxes. He then argued that, even if there was one fixed reality, two agents who started with prior beliefs at each end of the spectrum would not necessarily converge as long as agents could not freely find credible information to generalize from their own experience. In fact, he argued that information on how much effort really pays is not easy to observe (given that effort input is not observable), and that eventually agents would settle on some belief about the likely value of these parameters and stop experimenting (a form of bandit problem). Generalizing to countries, he argued that tax choices would reinforce these beliefs: where effort doesn't pay and luck dominates, agents would tend to vote on high taxes and luck would then really dominate. Indeed, the key finding in Piketty's paper is that two different economic systems, one with high taxes and beliefs that luck matters that can be called the French equilibrium and another with low taxes and a belief that effort pays that can be called an American equilibrium, could arise out of the same underlying reality. Other papers that explore related ideas concern the role of upward mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001) , fairness (Alesina and Angeletos, 2002) , belief in a just world (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) and corruption Angeletos, 2004 and MacCulloch, 2002) . North and Denzau (1993) discuss institutions as "shared mental models" (see also Greif, 1994) .
A belief-based explanation is attractive given the difficulties that the standard economic model (e.g., Meltzer and Richards, 1981) has in explaining the observed patterns of inequality and redistribution across Europe and the US. Indeed, these models are particularly relevant once one observes the remarkable differences in beliefs across the Atlantic. For instance, Alesina et al (2001) report that 60% of Americans -yet only 26% of Europeans -believe the poor are lazy, while spending on social welfare in 1995 in the US was 16% of GDP compared to an average of 25% for countries in Europe.
See also Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and the evidence in Hochschild (1981) , Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) , Fong (2004) and Ladd and Bowman (1998) inter alia.
Given the centrality of beliefs in economic organization, it seems natural to ask what drives beliefs.
Very little evidence (that has a causal interpretation) is available (but see Di Tella, Donna and MacCulloch, 2006 , on the connection with crime; and Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrdosky, 2004, on the connection with property rights and a windfall gain). One extreme position is to argue that beliefs are cultural norms and are thus immutable. Alternatively, a rational learning process would posit their dependence on economic conditions. The latter hypothesis is particularly interesting in the context of Latin America, in general, and Venezuela, in particular, given their rather eventful history, with several traumatic and joyous events that may have affected beliefs simply because reality, at least for a while, appeared to have changed. The oil discoveries and the high prices during the 1970's, the macroeconomic crises and the crime waves are all candidate episodes to be explored.
In this paper, we take some of the likely forces that may have affected the formation of beliefs in Venezuela, explore their validity using data from a broader sample of countries, and then use the results to see how much of the Venezuelan experience they can explain.
In section II we discuss the role of a history of macroeconomic volatility, in section III we explore the role of a country's dependence on oil rents; in section IV we present further results on the role of corruption and beliefs (along the lines discussed in Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002) , while section V presents the correlations between beliefs and having been the victim of crime. Section VI studies the correlation between beliefs about a phenomenon (corruption) and the beliefs about a second phenomenon (crime) controlling for reality (i.e., the experience with corruption and the experience with crime). Section VII discusses the results in the context of Venezuela while section VIII offers some concluding comments.
II. Beliefs and a History of Macro Volatility
In this section we study the correlation between a country's historical macroeconomic performance and their average beliefs in a cross-section of countries. We use the average values obtained from the Results in columns (1-4) in Table 1A focus on a general measure of beliefs: ideological selfplacement on a 0-10 scale. These regressions are illustrative as a first broad pass at the data as clearly the answers are provided with some country-specific ideological content. It is still perhaps interesting to note that a history of inflation volatility tilts the survey answers significantly to the left. In order to get some sense of the size of the effect, note that a one standard deviation of the History of Inflation Volatility variable is associated with a decline of Right Wing-R of 5.8% of a standard deviation of this variable (-0.058=(329.1/2.33)*(-4.1e-04)). Columns (2-4) in Table 1A presents similar regressions, using Business Owner-L. Columns (5-6) are positive and significant, while column (7) is positive but only significant at the 11% level.
1 The controls are chosen to keep constant some basic set of personal characteristics of the respondents that may affect beliefs (although these are country averages, so their influence in this particular case is marginal) without sacrificing sample size.
III. Beliefs and Oil
We now explore the hypothesis that economic dependence on oil causes the average beliefs in the country to lean towards the left-end of the political spectrum. The results are presented in Table 2, where we now focus on one summary variable of beliefs (ideological self-placement on a 1-10 scale)
and regress the average country-year values against several measures of dependence on oil. One improvement over the previous section is that, given that we are no longer interested in historical Column (1) reports a negative coefficient, significant at the 13% level, indicating a tendency to move left when fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandise exports) increase. Column (2) uses logs and reports a somewhat larger and considerably more precise coefficient on the dependence on oil (it is significant at the 1% level). In terms of size, a one standard deviation of Log Fuel Exports is associated with a decline equal to 4.6% of a standard deviation in (right-wing) beliefs.
The rest of the table switches to other measures of income's dependence on luck in the country.
Column (3) focuses on ores and metal exports as a percentage of merchandise exports. The coefficient is negative but insignificant. Column (4) uses logs, and finds a negative coefficient significant at the 8% level. In terms of size, a one standard deviation of Log Ores Exports is associated with a decline equal to 3.5% of a standard deviation in beliefs. Columns (5-6) present weaker results (but still with the expected sign) using Manufacturing Exports and its log.
IV. Beliefs and Corruption
In Table 3 we explore the relationship between ideological inclination and corruption. When corruption is widespread, the legitimacy of profits and business is called into question and individuals will be attracted to left-wing ideas, particularly in the economic sphere (see MacCulloch, 2002, 2006) . It uses a corruption variable as coded by experts working for Political Risk Services, a private international investment risk service. Introduced into economics by Knack and Keefer (1995) , the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index has been produced annually since 1982 and intends to capture the extent to which "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans".
Column (1) in Table 3 correlates the average ideological inclination in the country with the perceived corruption level, controlling for country and year effects. The coefficient is negative as expected and significant at the 3% level. In terms of size, we note that a one standard deviation (within) in the ICRG corruption indicator is associated with a decline in a country's ideological inclination, Right
Wing-R, equal to 3.7% of a standard deviation (within) of the ideological variable (-0.037=0.42*(-0.19)/2.15). Column (2) shows that the same correlation using logs is weaker as it is only statistically significant at the 10.5% level.
V. Beliefs and Crime
In Table 4 we study the connection between crime and beliefs following Di . Such a connection might be expected when, for example, agents have incomplete information about the role of effort in the income generating process and the observation of crime informs agents about other people's view of how much it pays to work hard (which is probably low, given that they have chosen crime). Indeed, the two equilibria in the Piketty (1995) model survive only as long as agents cannot observe how much effort others are putting in (and how much income they obtain). This requires that agents cannot reconstruct other people's information set from their choices in the labor market or in the political market which is a somewhat artificial assumption given that vote outcomes are well-known and also career choices (for example, criminal or not). In order to test this hypothesis we need data on people's beliefs and on their view of how much crime there is (or on their experience as victims of crime).
Such data can be found in the Latino-barometer, an annual public opinion survey of approximately 19,000 interviews in 18 countries in Latin America. Questions of interest rotate, so the number of waves (and thus our sample size) varies considerably depending on the question being studied. It is produced by Latinobarómetro Corporation, a non profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile. It has data on a number of attitudinal variables that are associated with ideological standing (on an economic dimension). From the long list we choose two that are suitable for our purposes. One concerns the fairness of the distribution of income and the other concerns how successful were privatizations.
The exact data is Fair-L (Now I'd like you some questions about the problem of poverty, in this country and in other countries: How fair do you think the distribution of income is in this country?
The four possible answers are 1. Very fair; 2. Fair; 3. Unfair; and 4. Very unfair) and Privatiz-L (Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Privatization of public companies has been beneficial to the country? The two possible answers are 1. I agree; and 2. I disagree).
In columns (1-2) of Table 4 we correlate these beliefs question with Perception of crime, the answer to the question "Crime has increased or decreased?". The possible answers are coded such that it takes the value 0 if the answer is "Has increased a lot" and 1 if it is "Has increased a little", "Has stayed the same", "Has fallen a little" or "Has fallen a lot". We collapse the answers into two because, although there are four categorical answers to this question, the overwhelming majority chooses one option. The raw data show that 96,358 individuals selected the answer "crime has increased a lot over the past year", while 14,610 say "it has increased somewhat", 8,591 say it has stayed the same, 2,904 say it has dropped somewhat and 439 say it has dropped a lot. We repeated the analysis using the four categories and all the results remain qualitatively similar. Both coefficients are negative as expected and significant. Note that this is unlikely to reflect a fixed trait of the respondents because such a fixed characteristic is most likely ideological orientation: right wing individuals are always complaining that crime is a terrible thing and also tend to think that the distribution of income is fair.
In this case the connection goes the opposite way so, at least in this regard, it is an underestimate of the true effect. We also include a set of control variables that help ameliorate this concern, including age, gender income as well as year and country fixed effects.
Columns (3-4) move to Real Crime as independent variable, namely whether the respondent (or a relative of the respondent) was a victim of crime over the previous year. Again, both coefficients are negative and comfortably significant. Now the potential confounding effect is not an ideological fixed effect but rather some omitted variable such as income, which determines that you are both the victim of crime and that you hold left wing views. Columns (5-6) repeat the exercise with a broader set of controls. These include age, gender, dummies for city size and all the previous explanatory variables but using a new measure of each respondent's income. A person's declared income level is now captured by the question: "The wage or salary you receive and the total family income, Does it allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?" The possible answers are: "It is good enough, you can save", "It is just enough, without great difficulties", "It is not enough, you have difficulties" and "It is not enough, you have great difficulties". The results are again supportive of the hypothesis that an experience with crime moved individuals to the left-end of the political spectrum. In auxiliary regressions we included controls for educational attainment, a person's ideological self-placement and simultaneous controls for both measures of income and obtained similar results.
VI. Perceptions versus Reality
Having established that perceptions of corruption and crime affect ideological inclination, it is
interesting to explore what drives these perceptions. Is it reality, so that people's perception of corruption follows the fact that there is more corruption? Or is it that these perceptions are like "moods" that can get divorced from reality? In a recent paper, Olken (2006) shows that there can be a substantial divorce between reality and perceptions using Indonesian data.
One possible strategy is to evaluate if the perception of a certain phenomenon is related strongly to the experience of that phenomenon or the perception of a (presumably unrelated) phenomenon. In Real Crime has virtually no effect (just over 1.4% in standardized units).
Regressions (5-6) repeat the exercise for Venezuela and reveal that the same phenomenon applies
there. This suggests that perceptions of corruption (and of other "bads") are driven not by reality, but rather by some other force. We conjecture that this makes the electorate particularly receptive to "political activists" who supply beliefs, as in Glaeser's (1995) model of hatred.
VII. The Case of Venezuela
We can apply the above results to the case of Venezuela. We first focus on the role of volatility of the economy. High levels of volatility may mean that the connection between effort and reward is lost. This may in turn affect people's (right-left) beliefs about the degree of regulation and taxation that is required for their society. Venezuela lies in the top quarter of the countries in our sample in terms of both inflation and unemployment volatility. An increase in inflation (unemployment) volatility from US to Venezuelan levels explains 6.9% (24.8%) of the difference in leftist beliefs about the degree to which the poor have been treated unfairly and 4.3% (21.0%) of the difference in leftist beliefs about the chances of escaping from poverty between these two nations (see Tables 1A and 1B).
Another striking feature of Venezuela is its' unusually high dependence on natural resources, in particular oil. To the extent that this country relies on abundant natural resources, becoming wealthy may be more associated with success in capturing rents and belonging to the elite, rather than on working hard in competitive industries. Venezuela has the second highest level of fuel exports as a proportion of total merchandise exports across all the countries in our sample (at 78.9%). The highest proportion is Nigeria (see Figure 1) . A high dependence on oil may also be one of the causes of the increased unemployment and inflation volatility discussed above (see, inter alia, Carruth, Hooker and Oswald, 1998 ). An increase in fuels as a proportion of total merchandise exports from US to Venezuelan levels is predicted to push an individual toward having more leftist beliefs by 1.1 units on the 0-10 right-left scale (see Table 2 ).
Fuel Exports (% merch exports) Turning to corruption, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index places Venezuela in the bottom 13% of nations in our sample. An increase in the corruption index from US to Venezuelan levels is predicted to push an individual toward having more leftist beliefs by 0.24 units on the 0-10 right-left scale (see Table 3 ). We also noted earlier how higher observed crime rates may lead people to believe that effort exerted in legal labour market activities is not rewarding thereby affecting their Table 4 ).
VIII. Conclusions
The starting point of this paper is the fact that the Venezuelan public is receptive to left wing, populist, anti-market rhetoric. This paper explores why. It uses anecdotal evidence to focus on four phenomena that appear to be widespread in Venezuela: a history of macro-volatility, an economic dependency on oil, a belief that corruption is widespread and the belief that there has been a crime wave in the country. These four phenomena are theoretically compatible with moving the electorate to the left, because macro-volatility and oil dependency mean that luck is important relative to effort in the determination of income, because corruption erodes the legitimacy of business (see for example Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002) and because widespread crime gives us information about how badly other people (criminals) fared in the labor market. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that beliefs are correlated with these forces.
Although these points broadly in the direction of realty being an important factor in the formation of beliefs for some of the factors study (e.g., our data on oil dependency is from actual oil dependency), the data on corruption used on Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) is based on the perception of corruption. Perceptions may sometimes be divorced from reality, as political players (like Hugo Chavez) can potentially affect the beliefs of the electorate (perhaps by attacking a political group for political gain). In an attempt to shed some light on the relative perception of reality, we run regressions of the perception of corruption on reality (personal experience with corruption) and on the perceptions of another phenomenon (the perceptions of how much has crime increased), controlling for reality. We note that the perceptions of corruption are strongly correlated with the perceptions of this second phenomenon (the increase in crime) and have a much weaker connection with the personal experience with corruption or crime (reality). Notes:
[1] Name of dependent variable has L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right).
Right Wing-R:
A categorical variable that is the answer to the question: "In politics people talk of the "left" and of the "right". In a scale where "0" is left and "10" is right, where would you place yourself?".
Unfair for Poor-L:
A dummy that is the response to the question: "Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view? (1) They are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, or (2) They are poor because society treats them unfairly." The dummy takes the value 1 if the answer is (2) and 0 if the answer is (1).
[2] All regressions are cross-section (3 rd wave) OLS regressions. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering) are in parentheses. The regressions include a set of personal controls which include age, gender and Income Ia (which is the respondents declared income level as captured in the answer to the question: "People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the lower class, the middle class, or the upper. How would you describe yourself?".
[3] Right hand side variables are constructed using the World Bank's World Development Indicators as follows: History of Inflation Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the inflation (CPI) 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages in %.
History of Growth Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the GDP growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages in %.
History of Exchange Rate Volatility:
Average of the absolute value of the Exchange Rate growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) calculated using the official exchange rate (LCU per US$, annual average) History of Unemployment: Average of the absolute value of the Unemployment rate 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages (% of total labor force). Notes:
No Escape-L:
A dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: "In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little chance of escaping? (1) They have a chance or (2) There is very little chance." was category (2) and 0 if it was category (1).
Business Ownership-L:
The response to the World Values question: "There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint the managers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers, (3) The government should be the owner and appoint the managers, (4) The employees should own the business and elect the managers". Business Ownership-L was defined as a dummy equals 1 if the answer is category (3) or (4) and 0 if the answer is category (1) or (2).
[3] Right hand side variables are constructed using the World Bank's World Development Indicators as follows: History of Inflation Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the inflation (CPI) 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages in %. History of Growth Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the GDP growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages in %.
History of Exchange Rate Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the Exchange Rate growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) calculated using the official exchange rate (LCU per US$, annual average) History of Unemployment: Average of the absolute value of the Unemployment rate 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3 rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages (% of total labor force) Notes:
[1] All regressions are OLS regressions and include country and year dummies.
[2] Dependent variable is Right Wing,-R a categorical variable that is the answer to the question: "In politics people talk of the "left" and of the "right". In a scale where "0" is left and "10" is right, where would you place yourself?" and is obtained from the WVS. The respondents declared income level as capture in the question "The wage or salary you receive and the total family income, Does it allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?" The possible answers are "It is good enough, you can save", "It is just enough, without great difficulties", "It is not enough, you have difficulties" and "It is not enough, you have great difficulties".
[9] City Size: The size of the city where the interview takes place. The 2 possible categories are 1 if "100,000 or less" and 2 if "capital or more than 100,000". The respondents declared income level as capture in the question "The wage or salary you receive and the total family income, Does it allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?" The possible answers are "It is good enough, you can save", "It is just enough, without great difficulties", "It is not enough, you have difficulties" and "It is not enough, you have great difficulties".
[8] Right Wing-R, is the answer to the World Values question: "In politics people talk of the "left" and of the "right". In a scale where "0" is left and "10" is right, where would you place yourself?".
[9] Standard errors in parentheses. 
